Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/02/23 : CIA-RDP87M01152R000100070016-2 FYI ONLY XX ER 85-1054 Office of Legislative Liaison Routing Slip INFO ACTION. TO:  $\mathbf{x}$  . 1. D/OLL
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	12	Compt		X				
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		SUSPENSE	22 March (interim report)					

Remarks

The DDCI will provide implement  $\mbox{mg} = \mbox{guidance}$  re this.

14 March 85

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14 March 1985

MEN	10R	AIII DI IA	1 FOR:

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Executive Director

Deputy Director for Intelligence Chairman, Security Committee

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Leaks

There is a lot to be done in following up on yesterday's meeting which and I had with the Attorney General, Leo Cherne and All of us agreed that the leak problem needs to be addressed in a comprehensive and orderly way. We agreed that the most effective way to curb leaks is to question the leakees who are the only parties to the offense of passing classified information into the hands of those not authorized to receive it who can be quickly and surely identified. We agreed there is sound legal basis and compelling security reasons for doing this. Steps to be taken in preparation for this include the following:

- 1. Informal discussions with a few journalists and publishers who are likely to understand the need and be sympathetic.
- 2. Study and report by a small blue ribbon panel made up of people with recognized national security concern and experience and no axes to grind.
- 3. Action to substantially reduce the amount of classification which is not essential for national security purposes. We need to know what has been done and what is being done in this respect and how to go about getting more of it done.
- 4. Carefully prepare the case to justify the need for doing something about this. \_\_\_\_\_\_ briefed half a dozen or so illustrations of how media reporting has cost us heavily in sources and methods. Everyone was greatly impressed by that but there is need for the following:
  - (a) Additional examples.

	Declassit		f some	of these	examples	so	that	the	cases
can be m	nade public	· .							

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(c) Reassessment of what we have lost in capabilities over the period of time, maybe five to ten years, and how we have lost it.

This analysis should define what further damage is still at risk once this material is gotten out and the value of fighting to contain further distribution of that information and the kind of differentiations which are needed between the general information already published and the additional information which would inflict further damage on capabilities. This needs to be done by experts in the major collection disciplines.

William J. Casey

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